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IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE IN TRAFFIC COURT
RAYMOND K. BERG*
AND
RICHARD L. SAMUELS* *THE IMPORTANCE of the traffic court in the framework of the
administration of justice cannot, and decidedly must not, be
overlooked or underrated. For more than ninety per cent of
the Americans who come into contact with the courts, their appear-
ance in traffic court is the only occasion they will have to personally
observe the administration of justice. This is so regardless of their
business, profession, or occupation. On a mundane level, the prac-
ticing attorney should recognize this fact as well; whatever else his
clients do, in all likelihood they drive motor vehicles and thus could
well be potential defendants in traffic court.
Today in Chicago the traffic court judge may sit in judgment at
any given moment on any one of the millions of persons who
must use the streets and highways of the city. The impact of the
court thus touches the lives of all persons, whether licensed opera-
tors, chauffeurs, passengers, or pedestrians. Most people think of
traffic courts only in terms of places where violators are, for the
most part, found guilty and fined or jailed. This narrow (and, for-
tunately, decreasingly prevalent) view overlooks the implications of
what happens as a consequence of the way in which traffic cases are
adjudicated. The well-demonstrated truth of the matter is that what
happens to the citizen in traffic court can and will influence his at-
* JUDGE BERG is the Supervising Judge of the Traffic Court, Chicago, Illinois.
He received his J.D. (cum laude) from DePaul University and his D.C.L. from
Cambridge University. JUDGE BERG has had broad experience in all aspects of law
as a teacher, prosecuting attorney, private practitioner, judge, judicial administrator,
and author.
* * JUDGE SAMUELS is a Magistrate in the Traffic Court, Chicago, Illinois. He
received his J.D. from the University of Chicago. His broad background includes
such diverse areas as private practice, teaching, and prosecutorial service as Chief
of the Juvenile Division as an Assistant State's Attorney. JUDGE SAMUELS is the
principle author of MANUAL OF PROCEDURES FOR JUDGES OF THE TRAFFIC DIVISION.
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titude toward law enforcement, toward the entire judicial system, and
toward the entire system of laws and justice. Thus, every effort which
improves the degree of justice in the traffic court enhances, in the
minds of the general public, the entire image of our system for
dispensing justice. The increase in respect for traffic laws creates as
an inevitable by-product respect for all laws and the administration
of justice. At the same time, this increase in respect for the traffic
laws carries with it the promotion of traffic safety through greater
voluntary compliance with rules of the road. It was for these rea-
sons that Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark spoke not with hyper-
bole, but with sincerity, when he said that "[t]here can be no more
important court in this whole land than the Traffic Court."'
Initially, this article will consider ways and means of achieving
improvement of policies, procedures, and practices in traffic courts.
Considerable mention will be made of the experience had, and
progress and improvement achieved, in the Traffic Division of the
First Municipal District of the Circuit Court of Cook County-the
Chicago Traffic Court. The Chicago Traffic Court has thrice re-
ceived the American Bar Association's highest commendation,2 and
recently was cited as the outstanding traffic court in the United
States.3 The recommendations set forth throughout this discussion,
therefore, have obviously been proven sound by experience. Ad-
mittedly, Chicago is a populous jurisdiction. But, it is equally cer-
tain that the problems and pitfalls of a traffic court are basically
the same in nature whether the court serves a metropolitan area
the size of Chicago or a small rural community. A citizen ap-
pearing in a small-town traffic court can react to the system of courts
and justice in the same way as a citizen who appears in a large-city
court. Notwithstanding the size of his jurisdiction, a judge sitting in
any traffic court could be sitting on a "powder keg" which could
explode at any time. And there is much an individual court can do,
1. Justice-From the Traffic Court to the Supreme Court, address by the
Honorable Tom C. Clark, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
American Bar Association's Northwest Regional Meeting, September 17, 1965,
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, September 17, 1965.
2. American Bar Association Traffic Court Award (Group I), First Place
1967-1968, First Place 1968-1969, and First Place 1969-1970, "For Outstanding Prog-
ress in the Improvement of Traffic Court Practices and Procedures."
3. Schiller, Best Traffic Court in the Nation, READERS' DIGEST, April, 1970,
at 219.
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again regardless of size, to achieve improvement by its own efforts.
LEGAL ASPECTS: DUE PROCESS IN TRAFFIC CASES
As a point of departure, a relevant consideration is that of the
legal approach to be taken in traffic cases. Perhaps this can most
effectively be done by analyzing what a traffic case and the traffic
court are not.
There are certain tendencies which decidedly should not be inter-
jected into, nor inflicted upon, a traffic case or the traffic court.
One tendency, which arises from time to time in traffic court, is an
endeavor to inject civil tort. aspects of traffic accident cases into
the criminal proceedings, i.e., to use the traffic court as a civil col-
lection agency. Another tendency is to reclassify a traffic offense
as a non-criminal act and, in the process, effectuate a shortcut of basic
procedural rights. Still another is the shocking and extreme notion,
offered occasionally, that traffic cases should be heard by an ad-
ministrative agency rather than by a court. All of the foregoing
tendencies have certain salient features in common. They all arise
from ill-considered notions of expediency; they all attack or de-
precate the standing of the traffic court; and they all are contrary
to due process of law.
There probably is not a traffic judge alive who has not, in a mov-
ing violation case involving a collision, heard efforts made to
dismiss the violation proceedings on the grounds that damages were
settled, or observed attempts to use the traffic court proceedings as a
vehicle for the prosecution of a civil case. In such instances some-
one is unwittingly seeking to abuse the responsibility and function
of the court in traffic violations. Such abuses, if permitted in colli-
sion cases, create the danger of being carried into non-accident cases.
The difference between the criminal case and the civil case is easily
recognizable. In one, the parties-litigant consist of the community
and the violator; the wrong committed is a violation of public rights,
and redress lies in a penalty paid to the public body. There, the
penalty is levied to deter this and other offenders from future similar
violations. In the civil case the parties-litigant are the party who
has suffered damages and the party who has acted wrongfully or
negligently; the wrong committed is a violation of private rights,
5051970]
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and redress lies in the payment of damages to the aggrieved indi-
vidual to make him whole. Moreover, the civil case contains ele-
ments not present in the criminal proceedings. When sued for
damages, the defendant has available such defenses as the contribu-
tory negligence of plaintiff and lack of proximate cause. He may
also contest the extent of damages. Such issues may not be raised
in the criminal case. If a defendant in traffic court is, in effect,
coerced into settling the civil damages, he is being deprived of his
right to present these civil case defenses.
The typical traffic violation is a malum prohibitum offense with
the sole issue being whether or not the defendant committed the
prohibited act. Nowhere do traffic laws provide for a defense of
"no accident."'4  Too often, in practice, the aspects of the criminal
case are clouded by the civil aspects. This intermingling affects the
evidence, proof, and procedure in the criminal case-all to the dis-
advantage of the prosecution, the defense, and the court.
A number of decisions dwell on what the position of the court
and the attorneys should be in a criminal action. The defense of
civil satisfaction of the debt was held not to be available to the de-
fendant in a prosecution for theft by deception. 5 The filing of crimi-
nal usury complaints by the prosecutor, and the continuance of such
cases to bring about restitution by defendant to his victims, was
deemed an abuse of the criminal process.6 An agreement by the
county attorney not to prosecute on the basis of defendant's agree-
ment to make restitution could not excuse the crime already com-
mitted.7 Restitution, or offer of restitution, is no defense to a crimi-
nal charge.8 An attorney who cooperated and participated in the
filing of a criminal charge of bigamy in order to obtain advantage
in a civil suit for divorce was held guilty of a breach of legal ethics
and was suspended from practice for a year.' Contributory negli-
gence by the victim has been held to be no defense to a criminal traffic
case." As stated by a Georgia court:
4. Campbell v. District of Columbia, 229 A.2d 157 (D.C. App. 1967).
5. People v. Alba, 46 Cal. App. 2d 869, 117 P.2d 63 (1941).
6. Harris v. Municipal Court, 209 Cal. 55, 285 P. 699 (1930).
7. Heartsill v. State, 341 P.2d 625 (Okla. Crim. 1959).
8. Broxson v. State, 192 So. 2d 511 (Fla. App. 1966).
9. In re Cohn, 46 N.J. 202, 216 A.2d 1 (1966).
10. State v. Long, 91 Idaho 436, 423 P.2d 858 (1967).
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A criminal trial for infraction of traffic laws does not involve such matters as the
relative diligence or negligence of parties to a collision, but concerns only whether
or not the defendant on trial is guilty of the violation with which he is charged.",
Having eliminated the possibility of a traffic case being a civil col-
lection case or the traffic court being a collection agency, what then
is a traffic case? In almost every state, where the traffic offense
charged is a violation of state statute, there is little difficulty. The
state penal or vehicle codes ordinarily define these as misdemean-
ors.' 2 The problem is more likely to exist in municipal ordinance
cases or "New York infractions."
An overwhelming number of cases support the proposition that re-
gardless of what name or classification be given to minor offenses,
if penalties may be imposed, then the defendants are entitled to all
protections afforded by the due process rules of criminal procedure.'"
In a prosecution for an alleged traffic misdemeanor the defendant
is afforded the presumption of innocence.' 4 The state must prove
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' 5 He is entitled to be rep-
resented by counsel,'" and in many cases is entitled to a court-ap-
pointed counsel if indigent.' 7  It has been held that he is entitled to
be advised of his right to counsel at trial.' If charged with a serious
traffic violation he is entitled to the benefit of the Miranda rule when
arrested.19 He has the right to be charged by a sufficient accusa-
tion.20 He may not be prosecuted twice for the same offense.2'
11. Pass v. State, 95 Ga. 510, 98 S.E.2d 135 (1957).
12. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, § 233 (1969).
13. City of Pueblo v. Clemmer, 150 Colo. 546, 375 P.2d 99 (1962), and cases
cited infra: notes 14-26 and 34-40.
14. State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959); State v. Tarquinio,
3 Conn. Civ. 566, 221 A.2d 595 (1966).
15. State v. Goodman, 8 Ohio App. 2d 166, 221 N.E.2d 202 (1966); Matthews
v. State, 414 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. 1967).
16. Taylor v. City of Griffin, 113 Ga. 589, 149 S.E.2d 177 (1966); Seattle v.
Buerkman, 67 Wash. 2d 537, 408 P.2d 258 (1965); In re Johnson, 42 Cal. Rptr.
228, 398 P.2d 420 (1965).
17. Dawson v. Los Angeles, 342 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1965); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 113-3 (1969).
18. In re Johnson, supra note 16; City of Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d
51, 226 N.E.2d 777 (1967).
19. State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 431 P.2d 691 (1967); State v. Randolph,
241 Ore. 479, 406 P.2d 791 (1965); Samuels, The Impact of Miranda in Traffic
Cases, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 17-18, 1968).
20. People v. Griffin, 36 111. 2d 430, 223 N.E.2d 158 (1967).
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He has the right to a speedy trial22 free from prejudicial error, just as
if he were being tried for a felony. 28 The prosecutor may not com-
ment on his failure to testify.2 4  If he is acquitted the prosecution
may not appeal; 25 and if he is convicted he has the right to be
heard in mitigation .2
In the majority of states there is no appreciable procedural dif-
ference between the treatment of state law violations and municipal
ordinance violations. This is because the penalties are generally the
same.27  However, in Illinois, violations of municipal traffic ordi-
nances are punishable by fine only.28 The Illinois approach has
been to regard ordinance violation cases as "quasi-criminal" and
endowed with many of the aspects of non-criminal cases.29 For
example, the city is required to prove its case by a preponderance of
evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt;30 the city may ap-
peal from a judgment acquitting the defendant;8 ' the pleading re-
quirements are not as stringent as in a misdemeanor case; 2 and,
just recently, an Illinois appellate court deemed the speedy trial re-
quirement of the so-called "120-day rule" probably inapplicable to
ordinance cases. 3
On the other hand, the reviewing courts in Illinois have indicated
21. State v. Gladden, 274 Minn. 533, 144 N.W.2d 779 (1966); State v. Hoben,
supra note 14; State v. Mayes, 245 Ore. 179, 421 P.2d 385 (1966).
22. Caputo v. Municipal Court, 184 Cal. App. 2d 412, 7 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1960);
State v. Saunders, 2 Conn. Civ. 20, 197 A.2d 533 (1963).
23. State v. Gegen, 275 Minn. 568, 147 N.W.2d 925 (1967); People v. De
Groot, 108 I11. App. 2d 1, 247 N.E.2d 177 (1969).
24. E.g., People v. Knutson, 17 Ill. App. 2d 251, 149 N.E.2d 461 (1958).
25. Toledo v. Crews, 174 Ohio St. 253, 188 N.E.2d 592 (1963).
26. People v. Louis, 112 Ill. App. 2d 356, 251 N.E.2d 373 (1969); People v.
Tompkins, 112 Il1. App. 2d 251, 251 N.E.2d 75 (1969); People v. Smice, 79 Ill.
App. 2d 348, 223 N.E.2d 548 (1967).
27. Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958); State v.
Hoben, supra note 14.
28. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-2-1 (1969).
29. Chicago v. Lewis, 28 Ill. App. 2d 189, 171 N.E.2d 70 (1960); Maywood v.
Houston, 10 Ill. 2d 117, 139 N.E.2d 233 (1956).
30. Chicago v. Joyce, 38 Ill. 2d 368, 232 N.E.2d 23 (1967); Chicago v. Carney,
34 111. App. 2d 303, 180 N.E.2d 729 (1963).
31. Evanston v. Waggoner, 90 Ill. App. 2d 5, 234 N.E.2d 354 (1967); Maywood
v. Houston, supra note 29.
32. People v. Stout, 41 111. 2d 292, 242 N.E.2d 289 (1968).
33. Midlothian v. Walling, 118 Ill. App. 2d 358, 255 N.E.2d 23 (1970).
JUSTICE IN TRAFFIC COURT
that an ordinance violation case has a number of features that would
require a modicum of criminal procedural due process. A defendant
in an ordinance violation proceeding need not testify against himself
if he chooses to remain silent.34 He is entitled to know what he is
being charged with,3 5 and, in 1969, an appellate court ruled that
the charge of "negligent driving" in the language of the ordinance
was insufficient unless particulars of the offense were also al-
leged.3" He is entitled to protection from unreasonable search and
seizure.37 If he is fined and is unable to pay it, the civil insolvent
debtors law does not apply.38  Also, the appellate court ruled re-
cently that a defendant charged with disorderly conduct in viola-
tion of a city ordinance was deprived of due process when she was
not permitted to make a telephone call while in custody.39  The
Washington Supreme Court ruled that a defendant in a city ordi-
nance parking violation case was entitled to be confronted by his
accuser.40 In the words of the California Supreme Court, in a traffic
case "there can be no impairment of the constitutional rights of any
defendant, however minor his crime." 4 1
What of the proposals to "declassify" traffic offenses, as typified
by the "New York infraction" concept?42 An argument for "de-
classifying" traffic offenses is that the traffic violator is not a "crimi-
nal." By reclassifying a traffic case and removing it from the penal
category, congestion in court calendars can be avoided, especially in
the area of excessive jury demands. To this, it is submitted in re-
buttal that the traffic violator is not in fact regarded by society as a
"criminal. '43 Secondly, the figures on jury demands do not support
the claim that congestion arises from jury trials in minor violations. 44
34. Chicago v. Berg, 48 Ill. App. 2d 251, 199 N.E.2d 49 (1964).
35. Chicago v. Stringfield, 37 Ill. App. 2d 344, 185 N.E.2d 381 (1963).
36. People v. Mowen, 109 Ill. App. 2d 62, 248 N.E.2d 685 (1969).
37. Chicago v. Lord, 3 Ill. App. 2d 410, 122 N.E.2d 439 (1954).
38. Chicago v. Thomas, 102 Ill. App. 2d 143, 243 N.E.2d 512 (1969).
39. Chicago v. Harmon, 117 Ill. App. 2d 361, 254 N.E.2d 573 (1970).
40. Seattle v. Stone, 67 Wash. 2d 886, 410 P.2d 583 (1966).
41. In re Johnson, supra note 16, at 235, 398 P.2d at 427.
42. NEW YORK VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 155 (McKinney 1970).
43. Consider the typical form of application for public employment: "Have you
ever been convicted of a crime other than a traffic offense?"
44. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORTS.
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Thirdly, jury trials in most minor offenses can be eliminated without
the creation of a new category of offenses.45 Finally, the latest pro-
posals for "infractions" state that such other procedural shortcuts as
the elimination of the right to assigned counsel for indigents "and
others as the occasion arises. .. ",4 are possible thereunder. This
notion of shortcuts "as the occasion arises" is contrary to the princi-
ple that there can be no impairment of the fundamental constitu-
tional rights of any defendant, however minor his crime. This prin-
ciple was enunciated by the California Supreme Court,47 where the
foregoing proposal was promulgated.
To declassify traffic offenses in such a manner would occasion
only short term expediency. Not only would it tend to lessen one's
appreciation for the seriousness of traffic laws and the traffic prob-
lem (and if 56,000 highway deaths a year is not "serious," nothing
is), but it could well conflict with the Constitution.
Judges and lawyers must be alerted to the existence of another
extreme proposal lest our system of jurisprudence be jeopardized.
This approach is similar to one that assumes that the cure for a
patient with a headache is to kill the patient. It is the "administra-
tive tribunal" proposal. It has been couched in beguiling language,
and occasionally has been seriously considered by well-meaning,
though misinformed, individuals. In its basic form, it represents
an attitude that courts, judges, lawyers, and the Constitution are
outmoded and tiresome. The proposal recites: "The existing mode
of handling traffic cases is outmoded. Traffic cases should be han-
dled by a specially created administrative agency. The person who
commits a traffic offense is not a criminal and should not be
treated-even procedurally-as a criminal. 48
Constitutionally, such proposed handling of traffic cases would
flagrantly violate the basic principle that judicial functions are within
45. According to Chief Justice Warren, the "right to jury as heretofore
enjoyed" means (a) was the offense triable by a jury at common law? and (b) is
the possible penalty substantial? Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
See also, In re Estate of Melody, 42 Ill. 2d 451, 248 N.E.2d 104 (1969).
46. California Judicial Council, Revised "Infractions" Proposal (Jan., 1967), n.6.
47. In re Johnson, supra note 16.
48. Reynolds and Samuels, Answer to Proposal that Traffic Cases Be Tried by
Administrative Tribunals, monograph presented at midyear meeting of American
Bar Association Standing Committee on Traffic Court Program, Feb. 5, 1966.
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the province of the courts. Further, it violates the constitutional
requirements of due process. Regardless of what name is given to
the offense, our American constitutional system requires a fair trial
in a court so constituted as to afford "due process" in the first
instance.49 It distills down to this: a traffic court is a court of law
-it must be conducted as such.
PROCEDURES: DIGNITY, FORMALITY AND CONSISTENCY
Recognizing that the traffic court is a court of law, and must be
conducted as one, an appropriate place to start improving the ad-
ministration of justice is in efforts of the court to operate as and
maintain an appearance of a properly constituted court of law.
First, the court must promulgate a set of ground rules pertaining
to procedure within the court and designed to ensure formality and
dignity in the courtroom. Concurrently therewith, the court should
by such ground rules enhance its service to those who appear before
it. The court systems in a number of states have been fortunate to
have rules of procedure in traffic cases promulgated by their re-
spective Supreme Courts-as in Ilinois-although these statewide
rules must be supplemented by local rules applicable to the operation
of an individual court.5"
At one time the Chicago Traffic Court did leave much to be de-
sired in the way of regularity, formality, and dignity of its procedures.
At the statewide level, the Illinois Supreme Court promulgated rules
applicable to traffic cases.51 But, while statewide rules are indispen-
sable to a court system, they do not in themselves ensure proper pro-
cedures within an individual court. Accordingly, over the past sev-
eral years the Chicago traffic judges found it necessary to confer
and, based upon their consensus, from time to time issue General
Orders and memoranda as the needs arose.
Early in 1970, the Chicago Traffic Court prepared and published
49. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Roberts v. Noel, 296 S.W.2d 745
(Ky. 1956); State ex rel. Osborne v. Chinn, 146 W. Va. 610, 121 S.E.2d 610
(1961); Williams v. Brannen, 116 W. Va. 1, 178 S.E.2d 67 (1935).
50. ECONOMOs, TRAFFIC COURT PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION 53 (1961).
51. ILL. Sup. C, R. 501-600, adopted by Supreme Court order October 26, 1967,
eff. January 1, 1968, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, §§ 501-600 (1969).
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its Manual of Procedures5 2 (hereinafter referred to as the "Man-
ual.") The introduction to the Manual states:
This Manual has been prepared by the Judges of the Magistrates' Division as-
signed to the Chicago Traffic Court-the Traffic Division of the First Municipal
District of the Circuit Court of Cook County-for the guidance and benefit of
those now or hereafter sitting in the Chicago Traffic Court. The practices, pro-
cedures and policies discussed herein represent the consensus of those sitting in
this Court. 55
The practices, policies, and procedures set forth in the Manual are
not newly created by the Manual. They represent a restatement of
those approaches instituted over the past several years consistent with
the needs of the court, the experiences of the court, and the best
thinking of the judges of the court. This Manual is the first instance
in which these practices, policies, and procedures have been gath-
ered together and organized into a unified whole. The expressed
purpose is:
to review some of the problems that require attention and to anticipate some
of the future ones inasmuch as our Court absorbs a constantly increasing caseload
I... [It is] in the interest of maintaining consistency and regularity of pro-
cedures and administration [that] this Manual has been prepared. 5 4
Chapter I of the Manual deals with procedure in the courtroom
prior to trial. The steps to be followed from the time defendants
and witnesses arrive in the courtroom to the calling of cases for
trial are described. Special mention is made of the need for a
formal opening of each court session and the requirement that the
judge begin every session with a short opening statement.55 This
opening statement covers the courtroom procedure, the legal rights
of the defendants, and the need for compliance with traffic laws.
The use of short opening statements by traffic judges is highly
recommended. This has been found to effect more frequent favor-
able reactions from those in the courtroom than almost anything
else done by the judge.56 Moreover, not only does this result in in-
creased public respect for the administration of justice in the traffic
52. MANUAL OF PROCEDURES FOR JUDGES OF THE TRAFFIC DIVISION, FIRST MU-
NICIPAL DISTRICT, CIRCUIT COURT OF. COOK COUNTY (1970).
53. Id. at i.
54. Id. at ii.
55. Id. at 2, 28-29.
56. See, e.g., Column by Mike Royko, Chicago Daily News, November 4, 1969,
at 3, col. 1.
[Vol. XIX:503
JUSTICE IN TRAFFIC COURT
court, but it also has been held sufficient to advise defendants of
their legal rights. 7
Without limiting the judge's discretion, the Manual goes on to
prescribe guidelines in the matter of courtroom procedure at trial.58
When the case is called, the judge is reminded that he has an op-
portunity to observe the demeanor of the defendant. 9 He is also
reminded that, notwithstanding the possibility of a heavy court call
arraignment and plea must be taken in open court;60 witnesses must
be sworn in accordance with the Canons of Ethics;6' the judge
may ask questions to clarify but should never prosecute the case; 2
the appearance of "trial by huddle" should be avoided; the judge
should avail himself of the opportunity to improve the driving habits
of a defendant before him; and memoranda which might be perti-
nent during the trial are subject to the doctrines of "present recollec-
tion refreshed" and "past recollection recorded." 6  To remind the
judge that he, and not a non-judicial employee, is in full charge of the
courtroom, he is directed to "make sure that his courtroom person-
nel maintain a high degree of courtesy to the people appearing in
the courtroom. '6 4
In certain facets of procedure it becomes necessary for the court
to balance the rights of both sides in the interests of justice. For
example, the right of a defendant to a continuance to prepare his
case cannot be repeatedly exercised so as to "delay and harass effec-
tive prosecution of the crime."65 The judge, himself, should be
solely responsible for the granting of continuances, and the policies
of the Chicago Court as stated in the Manual prohibit sub rosa
continuances or continuances by persons other than the judge, and
contain guidelines to ensure that cases are expeditiously disposed
of without depriving a defendant of sufficient time to prepare his
57. State v. Brown, 250 La. 1023, 201 So. 2d 277 (1967); State v. Simmonds,
5 Conn. Cir. 178, 247 A.2d 502 (1968).
58. Supra note 52, at 4-7.
59. Supra note 52, at 4.
60. Supra note 52, at 4.
61. See, Ill. Judicial Cannon 33; ABA Cannon 36.
62. People v. McGrath, 80 fI1. App. 2d 229, 224 N.E.2d 660 (1967).
63. Supra note 52, at 5, 68-69.
64. Supra note 52, at 2-3.
65. People v. Washington, 41 Ill. 2d 16, 241 N.E.2d 425 (1968).
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defense. As regards another facet, dismissals for want of prosecu-
tion, the Manual sets forth a yardstick for recognizing that while a
case may ordinarily be dismissed in the absence of any prosecuting
witness, there are exceptional circumstances, such as the defendant's
own conduct, militating against this right.6"
The overcrowding which plagued the Chicago Traffic Court in
past years has been virtually eliminated. This has resulted mainly
from the addition of new and additional facilities. On occasion, a
single courtroom might now become overcrowded for one session
because of an unexpected imbalance in caseload between the respec-
tive courtrooms, but this would happen in any multi-judge court in
spite of the best efforts at calendar control for a number of reasons,
such as a police officer's change of assignment. To cope with this
occasional situation, a procedure for the transfer of cases between
courtrooms has been worked out and has proved efficacious in keep-
ing the length of each session in every courtroom within the scheduled
time.
7
Within the courtroom, after the call of cases is over, it is necessary
that the judge complete "post court proceedings." This entails his
making certain that his entries on the files correspond with his en-
tries on the corresponding calendar sheets, and that every case file
contains his order in his own handwriting. In addition, before "clos-
ing out," the judge must order appropriate sanctions against those
defendants who failed to appear. "Post-court" steps in the Chicago
Court are described in detail in the Manual.68
It is readily apparent that an individual traffic court can and
should promulgate "local rules" for formality and dignity therein for
the improvement of its own procedures. This power, to govern its
own procedures not inconsistent with rules of its supreme court, is a
valuable inherent power of a court. 69
66. See, ILL. SuP. CT. R. 504; supra note 52, at 9.
67. Supra note 52, at 14-15.
68. Supra note 52, at 16-17.
69. See, e.g., Kolkmann v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 P. 575 (1931); Winberry v.
Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950), cert. den., 340 U.S. 877 (1950). See
also, supra note 50, at 51-52.
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SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC
Another important aspect of administration of justice is in the
service the court renders to the members of the public who appear
before it. While a defendant's appearance in court is not, for him,
a joyous occasion, an efficiently administered traffic court can greatly
enhance the image of justice by eliminating as much as possible the
onerousness of his appearance.
There is no pressing reason why a defendant cannot ordinarily be
tried at his first appearance in court-the return day set forth in the
summons or notice to appear. 70  There is no valid reason why, if he
pleads not guilty, he must as a matter of course be forced to return
on another date. This "trial at first appearance" can easily be af-
forded by means of an "officer's day in court" system, wherein each
police officer who issues traffic tickets is assigned a particular court
date, court session, and courtroom for the trials of his tickets. Sur-
prisingly enough, Chicago is virtually the only large city where this
is done as a matter of course. The Chicago Police Department, since
becoming accustomed to the system, unequivocally endorses it. Re-
cently, the federal government endorsed "trial at first appearance"
procedures. 71
Further, recognizing that most defendants in the traffic court are
not represented by counsel, it was deemed appropriate that motion
procedures in the Chicago Traffic Court should be made as simple
and expeditious as possible, while remaining within the framework of
legal procedure. Accordingly, a simplified motion procedure was
instituted in 1967, enabling any defendant who has a problem in a
traffic case that could be resolved via a motion to file his own in-
formal pleading and have his motion heard at that time by the "In-
stant Motion Court." This instant motion practice is detailed in the
Manual.72
While indigent defendants charged with major traffic violations
which could result in substantial jail sentences are entitled to be rep-
resented by a public defender 73 (there is a public defender regularly
70. Supra note 50, at 58-59, 145.
71. National Highway Safety Bureau, Traffic Courts, HIGHWAY SAFETY PRO-
GRAM STANDARDS UNDER THE HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT OF 1966 § 4.4.7 (1968).
72. Supra note 52, at 22-23.
73. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3 (1969).
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assigned to the Chicago Traffic Court), a great need has long existed
for those many people who are able to afford counsel or whose cases
were not of sufficient gravity to entitle them to the public defender.
In past years, the court suffered from the incidence of solicitation of
cases by a small group of attorneys who frequented the Traffic Center
with their agents and "runners." This solicitation has been elimi-
nated by such direct court action as exclusion of the offending parties
or contempt citations. To enable any party who desires counsel and
does not have one the opportunity to consult with a reputable at-
torney, the Traffic Court Lawyer Reference Plan was recently in-
stituted, whereby the Chicago Bar Association makes lawyers (re-
gardless of whether such lawyers are members of the Chicago Bar
Association or not) available on a regular rotation basis at the Traf-
fic Court for such defendants. This plan is the first of its kind in
traffic courts throughout the United States, and well illustrates the con-
tribution toward upgrading a traffic court that the legal profession can
make.
These are but a few of the innovations undertaken by the Chicago
Traffic Court for the benefit of the citizenry. They can serve as ex-
amples of what can be done to serve the public.
CORRECTING THE VIOLATOR
Too often traffic courts in the United States have been tagged
with a reputation of being revenue-oriented. The reputation and
public image of the court can only be hurt by an approach which as-
sumes that the court is in operation for the purpose of raising the
maximum possible monies in fines and court costs for the benefit
of the local government. Justice is not served, nor driving habits
improved, by an approach which imposes set fines for every viola-
tion regardless of circumstances and regardless of the nature of the
offender. Too many jurisdictions employ a system whereby most
defendants can answer for their violations merely by paying fines
over a counter or by posting and forfeiting bonds. Whatever the
form, if this procedure is used in most cases, it generates a "violate-
for-a-price" attitude among the driving public and lends credence
to the feeling that the traffic court is in business as a revenue-pro-
ducing agency.
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Thus, it is the stated and announced policy of the Chicago Traffic
Court that "the aim of the Traffic Court in imposing penalties is to
correct and educate, and to impress defendants with the need for
observance of the traffic laws."' 74 In addition to fines, Chicago Traf-
fic Court judges employ such penalties as requiring enrollment in the
court's Driver Improvement School, psychiatric referral, probation
techniques, and such "instant driver improvement" by judges as as-
signment of essays, attendance at court sessions, and the like.
The Chicago Traffic Court operates its Driver Improvement School
for the benefit of those defendants referred thereto by judges of the
court. Such defendants are so referred because of some lack in
their ability to observe traffic laws or, where the court deems it ap-
propriate, for the correction of their driving habits. Last year 16,000
defendants were referred to and successfully completed the Driver
Improvement School course.
Because elderly drivers in Illinois are faced with complete re-
examination for driver license renewals, the court has recently in-
augurated its "Senior Citizen Program." Here, special sessions of
the Driver Improvement School are devoted to a thorough refresher
of the older driver's knowledge of traffic laws and requisite skills so
that he may keep abreast of the increasing complexity of the traffic
problem and of the rules of the road.
Since the court cannot properly correct and educate a defendant
who does not personally appear before the court, defendants charged
with hazardous violations should be and are required to appear in
person. In Illinois, mandatory court appearances are covered by a
rule of the Supreme Court.7" In the absence of a statewide rule,
there is no reason why a local court could not promulgate such a
rule.76
JUDICIAL EDUCATION
For a traffic judge to best perform his judicial duties, he must
naturally possess an adequate legal background. It is certain that he
should also be knowledgeable in traffic laws and the numerous fac-
tors which constitute the traffic problem. The experiences of citi-
74. Supra note 52, at 18.
75. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 551.
76. Supra note 69.
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zens who have appeared before untrained traffic judges throughout
the United States are legend and the reactions thereto highly critical.
To fill the need for trained traffic judges in America, yeoman
service has been carried on for twenty-five years by the American
Bar Association Traffic Court Program which sponsors regional and
state traffic court conferences for traffic judges, prosecutors, and
court personnel. 77  In recent years, a number of states have offi-
cially joined in these efforts by setting up regularly held statewide
conferences with the expenses of attendance paid by the state.78
In addition to making such continuing judicial education avail-
able at conferences, the Chicago Traffic Court instituted a program
of one-day training seminars held at the court. These seminars
have served to update the judges' knowledge of problem areas in
traffic laws, such as driving under the influence of alcohol cases
and procedural due process. This type of activity could easily be
duplicated in non-metropolitan areas, with a number of "small town"
judges attending from within the same area in a state.
The Manual of the Chicago Traffic Court, in addition to delinea-
ting procedures and policies, also represents special effort to up-
date judges' and attorneys' knowledge of the traffic laws. Half of
the Manual is devoted to a detailed discussion of the latest develop-
ments in Illinois traffic law, with extensive consideration of perti-
nent recent cases. Not only has this finger tip availiability of the law
been extremely helpful to the judges, but also it has benefited the
traffic prosecutors and defense counsel as well.
ADMINISTRATION: THE "FIX" PROBLEM
St. Paul, nearly two thousand years ago, exhorted men to "abstain
from all appearance of evil."79  This exhortation has been valid and
sound throughout the ages, and has been judicially reflected in Can-
ons of Ethics and Rules of Judicial Conduct. In the words of the
Illinois Rules, a judge must "avoid impropriety and the appearance
77. This fact is personally known to the authors from their having attended
such conferences. For a fuller description, see ABA TRAFFIC COURT PROGRAM,
Services Available (1967).
78. For example, Illinois and California.
79. 1 Thessalonians 5:22.
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of impropriety."80  Departures from this basic axiom have resulted
in horrendous "black eyes" for courts and the administration of jus-
tice.
Situations which could subject a traffic court to embarrassment or
actual scandal are possible in a court of any size. Traffic court
"fix" scandals are not confined to large cities. Concededly, ten or
fifteen years ago an examination of newspaper articles from Chicago
would disclose accounts of court personnel indicted and fired, files
"pulled," cases fixed, solicitation of cases openly and notoriously
carried on, and practically every conceivable irregularity imaginable.
At that time most people appearing in the court felt that they some-
how had to fix their case in order to receive a fair trial. Whether
this opinion was justified or not, it was the public's view of the
court."'
Fortunately, this is no longer the reputation of our court but it
was a long hard struggle to overcome that gruesome image. A
detailed account of the steps taken to eliminate the "fix" image would
extend far beyond the pages available for this discussion. However,
a capsule summary of some of the avenues of approach, which could
apply to any traffic court, would be useful.
First, it is essential that the responsibility of administering a traffic
court lie with the judge (or, in a multi-judge court, the chief judge or
supervising judge). All nonjudicial personnel attached to the court
must be under the direct supervision and control of the judge.
Second, there should be a system of procedural and administrative
safeguards and cross-checks. For example, every word spoken in a
courtroom in the Chicago Traffic Court is recorded on tape and
preserved. A judge's order, in his own writing, is entered in three
places-the file, the file tab, and the calendar sheet-as well as re-
corded on an IBM computer card. The Court has its own under-
cover investigators, whose presence keeps all personnel alert.
Even without the financial resources to maintain computerization,
recording, and investigative staffs, a system of cross-checks is possi-
80. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 61(c)(4), eff. March 15, 1970.
81. "The Traffic Court Image," address by the Honorable Raymond K. Berg,
Supervising Judge of the Chicago Traffic Court, 1970 Western Regional Traffic
Court Conference, Los Angeles, January 30, 1970, in Los Angeles Metropolitan
News, January 30, 1970.
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ble and desirable. For example, it is a simple task for the judge, the
courtroom prosecutor, and the courtroom clerk each to maintain
daily disposition reports, all of which must correspond with each
other.
Third, the problem of "ticket-pulling" or "ticket-fixing" can be
resolved whether the court's operation is possessed of a sophisticated
computer system or employs a manually-kept ledger system. The
resolution of this problem can be found in the use of a set of multi-
copy, pre-numbered traffic tickets, with a copy for each of the in-
volved persons or agencies-the court, the driver licensing authority,
the arresting officer, the police department, and the defendant. With
all these people involved, it is virtually impossible to "lose" or to "fix"
a ticket. Coupled with this, the court must maintain a master con-
trol and disposition ledger to set forth the status of every pre-num-
bered ticket and book of tickets issued to a police officer. This
ledger can be spot checked revealing instantly the numbers on any
tickets which need an explanation.8 2 Such ledger should be subject
to an internal audit as to status and disposition of each ticket. In
a highly computerized manner this is what is done in Chicago, both
within the Court and the Police Department. The use of multicopy,
pre-numbered tickets, with the accompanying ledger and audits pro-
motes the requisite case accountability which is sometimes popu-
larly referred to as "no-fix tickets."
Fourth, the court should be required to submit regular reports
to other governmental agencies, and to the state supreme court or
court administrator. Further, an external audit should be con-
ducted, at least annually by an independent agency, as is done in
Chicago.
Finally, a major problem facing any large traffic court, and one
which faced the Chicago Traffic Court, is a backlog of unsatisfied
parking tickets. A citizen who avoids paying a succession of park-
ing tickets without ever appearing in court soon regards the law as
something he can evade with impunity. He is, then, a "scofflaw. '18
If such a backlog of unsatisfied tickets exists, steps must be taken
82. For a comprehensive discussion on the format and use of such a ledger,
see supra note 50, at 118.
83. Failure to serve warrants has been described as the "automatic fix." See
supra note 50, at 96-97.
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to bring the "scofflaw" offenders to court and have these tickets
paid or otherwise satisfied. In Chicago, by means of the special
"Scofflaw Court" established in the Traffic Court, thousands of
multiple ticket violators have been brought to justice. Even more
important than the millions of dollars realized in fines has been the
effect on the driving public; prompt payment of parking tickets has
become the rule rather than the exception, evidenced by a note-
worthy increase in voluntary compliance with traffic ordinances.
While unsatisfied tickets and unserved warrants are not ordinarily
part of intentional improprieties, their effect on respect for traffic
laws is equally detrimental. It is recommended to every traffic judge
that he make certain that there is a system of regular follow-ups on
every unpaid fine or unsatisfied warrant.
SUPPORT FROM THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE PUBLIC
Practicing attorneys in a community too often are reluctant to
appear and defend their clients in traffic courts, particularly if the
client is charged with a "minor violation." Frequently, this attitude
arises from the length of time counsel feels he must wait in court
for the call of his case rather than the time actually required for
trial. He feels that the cost of his time so spent cannot be met by
the fee he can reasonably charge. However, in the Chicago Traffic
Court, as a result of the calendar control system now in effect, coun-
sel can appear, answer ready for trial, and try his case all within less
than an hour. An attorney decidedly should defend cases in the
traffic court. Not only is he doing his client a service, but he is also
aiding the court in its efforts to maintain high procedural standards.
Outside of the legal profession, the help of interested community
groups concerned with traffic safety has been solicited and freely
given. The court has taken its message to the communications media
with the intention of educating the public to the need for a better
traffic court and to enhance public support for court improvements.
These media have understood the importance of improving the Traf-
fic Court and have been of great assistance.
In addition to organized citizen groups, interested bar associations,
and communications media, traffic judges should have and do have
access to community leaders who are genuinely concerned with traf-
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fic safety. These community leaders should be of such standing and
prestige that their espousal of any legitimate program assures it of
success. As an advisory council to the traffic court, a group of these
leaders function as a two-way avenue of communication: on one
hand, they bring to the judge the best considered opinions and
expertise in traffic enforcement and engineering; on the other hand,
they serve as a vehicle to promote, among key segments of the public,
acceptance of the court's policies. Such a group was organized in
Chicago, in 1969, as the "United Council for Traffic Safety."
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the foregoing discussion, the authors have attempted to point
out the highlights of principles and practical aspects of improving
the administration of justice in traffic courts. The principles and
propositions expressed, and the recommendations following, are
based upon the experience of the Chicago Traffic Court and the
findings by the authors as to what has succeeded in other jurisdictions.
It is therefore recommended: (1) That judges and attorneys always
bear in mind that the traffic court is the court which can "make or
break" respect for law and the image of justice, since for most people
their appearance in traffic court is their only contact with law and
the courts; (2) that it be remembered that the basic problems of
traffic courts are the same regardless of the size of the court or the
territory served by the court; (3) that the traffic court is a court of
law and must be conducted with the dignity and formality appro-
priate to a court of law; (4) that regardless of what name or classi-
fication be given to a traffic offense, a defendant is entitled to those
basic procedural guaranties included in "due process"; (5) that
judges and other personnel of the traffic court always remember
their duty of service is to the public; (6) that the traffic court make
rules for the orderly conduct of proceedings in that court; (7) that
the judge, or judges, of the traffic court have the authority and re-
sponsibility to exercise supervision and control over the personnel
of the court; (8) that constant and vigilant administration be ex-
ercised by the court not only to avoid impropriety, but also to avoid
any appearance of impropriety; (9) that every traffic court institute
and maintain constant and regular procedures designed to avoid back-
logs in unserved warrants and unsatisfied fines; (10) that the judge
522 [Vol. XIX:503
JUSTICE IN TRAFFIC COURT
remember in conducting the traffic court that the function of the
court is to inculcate respect for the law and improve driving habits,
and not to act as a revenue-producing agency; (11) that the traffic
judge be particularly knowledgeable in traffic laws and traffic prob-
lems in addition to his general legal background, and to this end,
that he be afforded specialized continuing judicial education therein;
(12) that attorneys, whenever possible, represent their clients in
traffic court, and that the legal profession interest itself in encourag-
ing high standards of practice by attorneys in that court; (13) that
considerable court improvement can be achieved by the court's own
efforts; and (14) that it is indeed possible to achieve improvement in
the administration of justice in any traffic court. The court should
admit to itself that it needs improvement, it should take steps to ef-
fectuate improvements within itself, and it should enlist the assistance
and support of other governmental agencies, citizen groups, bar
associations, communications media, and experts in the field. Fi-
nally, it should constantly maintain its efforts at improvement.
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